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ValueWhat factors determine thewillingness to inﬂict collective punishment upon a group for amisdeed committed by
individual group members? This research investigates the effect of collective responsibility shared among group
members and themoderating effect of the group's political organization (democratic vs. nondemocratic). Hypoth-
esizing that moral accountability should be greater for democratic offender groups compared to nondemocratic
groups, ﬁve experiments showed that the positive effect of collective responsibility on support for collective pun-
ishment (Experiment 1)was stronger for democratic groups than for nondemocratic groups (Experiments 2–5). A
sixth experiment revealed that the moral and social value ascribed to democracy led to higher expectations
towards democratic groups, resulting in negative perceptions of the democratic offender group and ultimately
in increased collective punishment. The results are discussed in terms of defense strategies of democratic values.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.In his “Letter to America”, Osama Bin Laden (2002) claimed that:
America is the land of freedom…. Therefore, the American people are
the ones who chose their government by way of their own free will, a
choice which stems from their agreement to its policies…. This is why
the American people cannot be innocent of all the crimes committed
by Americans… against us.
Offender responsibility is a central determinant of retributive judg-
ments (e.g., Darley & Pittman, 2003; Darley & Schultz, 1990; Feather,
1996; Miller, 2001; Schultz & Schleifer, 1983; Vidmar & Miller, 1980).
This is why the extension of a punishment from an actual offender to
his or her group is often seen as illegitimate, given that innocent people
should not be punished for a wrongdoing perpetrated by others.iss National Science Foundation
m, Department of Social and
T Amsterdam, The Netherlands.Nonetheless, collective punishments are common in social life
(Heckathorn, 1988; White, 1994; Whitmeyer, 2002), for instance
in schools, the military, and other institutions. As shocking as the
abovementioned quote may sound, Bin Laden justiﬁed the 9/11 attacks
on the basis of the United States' democratic system. This example
suggests that the link between collective punishment and collective
responsibility might be more complex, and depend on factors such as
the group's political organization. The present research sets out to
provide a better understanding of this phenomenon by investigating
whether perceptions of collective responsibility shape support for
collective punishment to a greater extent for democratic groups than
for nondemocratic ones.
We contend that collective punishment depends not only on what
group members actually did (i.e., on how responsible they are for the
offense), but also on who they are (i.e., on the group's characteristics).
We argue that whereas democratic groups enjoy greater social value
than nondemocratic ones, this value could backlashwhen it is tarnished
by a misdeed that holds the group accountable. Therefore, democratic
groups should be punished more harshly under conditions of collective
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ble due to being democratic, but rather because such behavior clashes
with expectations held towards such a valued group.
Collective punishment and collective responsibility
We deﬁne collective punishment as the negative treatment
inﬂicted by authorities or by an outgroup upon an entire social
group, in reaction to an offense committed by one or some of its mem-
bers (Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, Depuiset, & Butera, 2007). Even if a
collective punishmentmay beperceived as a legitimatemeans for deter-
rence and prevention purposes (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Heckathorn,
1988, 1990), it targets people who did not directly perpetrate the of-
fense and are punished merely because they belong to the same group
as the culprits. Thus, collective punishment is at odds with the individ-
ual responsibility principle that constitutes the basis of criminal law and
states that punishment should be proportionate to guilt (Carlsmith,
Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Carlsmith, 2008; Darley, 2002; Hart, 1968;
Kant, 1952/1790; Piaget, 1932). Collective punishment is even
prohibited by the Geneva 1949 Conventions (art. 33 from the Fourth
Geneva Convention, “1949 Conventions, additional protocols, their
commentaries”, 1949).
The willingness to punish a group should nevertheless increase as
the ascription of collective responsibility increases (e.g., Schultz &
Schleifer, 1983). Collective responsibility refers to the ascription of
responsibility to an entire group (Feinberg, 1968; Lickel, Schmader, &
Hamilton, 2003; see May, 1987), because its members have committed
a wrongdoing (causal responsibility). But collective responsibility can
also be ascribed when group members do not have a direct causal role
in the wrongdoing and therefore remain technically innocent (moral
responsibility; Zimmermann, Abrams, Doosje, & Manstead, 2011), a
situation that constitutes the focus of the present research. Somewhat
surprisingly, only a few studies have examined the link between collec-
tive responsibility and collective punishment. One study showed that
the attribution of moral collective responsibility was indeed positively
related to collective punishment (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007). In a
similar vein, vicarious punishment (a form of collective punishment in
which a group member other than the original offender is targeted by
retaliatory punishment) was correlated to perceptions of moral respon-
sibility, but onlywhen itwasmeasured after the assignment of vicarious
punishment (Cushman, Durwin, & Lively, 2012).
By experimentally studying this issue, the present research aims to
ﬁll this gap and provide a better understanding of the conditions
under which collective responsibility inﬂuences the willingness to pun-
ish a group for the misdeed of its individual members. We ﬁrst show
that collective responsibility increases support for collective punish-
ment. Second, we contend that the extent to which collective responsi-
bility affects collective punishment depends on the group's political
organization: collective responsibility of democratic groups, as opposed
to nondemocratic responsibility, leads to a greater increase in support
for collective punishment.
Democratic versus nondemocratic groups
Past research has demonstrated that democracy provides value to
innocent members of democratic groups, thereby protecting them
from bad treatment. As a result, aggressive acts against a group are
perceived asmore legitimate when the perpetrator group is democratic
rather than nondemocratic and the victim group is nondemocratic
(Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, Depuiset, & Butera, 2005). In addition,
democratic groups are less collectively punished for such a misdeed as
compared to nondemocratic groups (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007).
Similar ﬁndings have also been shown in the context of alleged inter-
state armed conﬂicts (Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, Staerklé & Butera,
2012; Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, Pereira & Butera, 2012). This leniency
effect has been shown to emerge as a function of the value ascribed todemocracy (Pereira, Falomir-Pichastor, Berent, Staerklé, & Butera,
2014) and to be mediated by the perceived value of the offender
group (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007). Overall these ﬁndings demon-
strate that the value of democracy infuses retributive judgments in
such a way that people show more lenient judgments towards demo-
cratic (vs. nondemocratic) groups.
In the present research, we argue that democratic groups are not al-
ways protected in retributive judgments. Given that democratic groups
are more valued by default and are expected to organize and resolve
conﬂicts in a peaceful way (Staerklé, Clémence, & Doise, 1998; see also
Healy, Hoffman, Beer, & Bourne, 2002), and that peaceful and honest
acts are more valued than aggressive and dishonest acts (Feather,
1999), people might establish higher standards of conduct for demo-
cratic than for nondemocratic groups (e.g., Doyle, 1983). Expectancy-
violation theory suggests that, when an individual's characteristic or
behavior deviates from held expectations, subsequent perceptions of
that individual are polarized, becoming more positive or more negative
according to the direction of the expectancy violation (Jussim, Coleman,
& Lerch, 1987). As a consequence, the wrongful behavior of a valued
democratic group should violate people' expectations towards such
groups to a larger extent than that of nondemocratic groups. Such
expectancy violation should result in a reduction of the value ascribed
to the perpetrator group, which in turn should lead to a stronger will-
ingness to see that group punished.
Indirect evidence for such a proposition can be found in research
investigating evaluations and treatments of valued people, such as
ingroup members or group leaders. These are generally more positive as
compared to those of non-valued people, but the reverse is also
observed. When it comes to punishment, more negative treatments of
valued people have been shown to originate from perceptions of expec-
tancy violations (Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999; Karelaia & Keck,
2013). In line with this reasoning, the subjective group dynamics model
(Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998; Marques, Abrams,
& Serôdio, 2001) suggests that the motivation to preserve a positive
image of one's group and its core values can either lead to a more lenient
ingroup punishment (in line with the ingroup bias hypothesis; Tajfel &
Turner, 1986; see also Lieberman & Linke, 2007) or to a more severe
one that aims at the symbolic exclusion of the offending ingroupmember
from the group (in line with the black sheep hypothesis, Marques & Paez,
1994; see also Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, &Weathers, 1995). The emergence
of one or the other pattern depends on several factors either related to the
offense (Karelaia & Keck, 2013) or to the offender (Gollwitzer & Keller,
2010; Iyer, Jetten, & Haslam, 2012; Okimoto &Wenzel, 2010). In particu-
lar, more favorable ingroup judgments are observed when the fellow
group member's wrongdoing can be minimized because of the absence
of certainty regarding the offender's guilt, but harsher judgments are
observed when offender responsibility is unambiguous (van Prooijen,
2006, 2010), consistent with an expectancy violation explanation.
Hence, it appears that the effects of responsibility on punishment are
stronger for valued than for devalued people, in line with our rationale
concerning democratic and nondemocratic groups. In particular, we
want to make clear that we expect such effect to appear above and
beyond the potential effect of a greater perceived collective responsibil-
ity for democratic groups: At an equivalent high level of collective
responsibility, a misdeed committed by a democratic group member
should be punished more harshly as compared to that of a nondemo-
cratic group member. Accordingly, in the present research we also
examine whether the effect of democratic vs. nondemocratic group
organization on support for collective punishment predicted at high
levels of collective responsibility is associated with increased expectan-
cy violation and a subsequent decrease in group value.
Overview and hypotheses
The present research investigates the effect of perceived collective
responsibility and group political structure on judgments of collective
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creases as perceived collective responsibility of the offender group does
(Hypothesis 1). We also predict the political organization of the offend-
er group to moderate this effect (Hypothesis 2), such that the effect of
collective responsibility on support for collective punishment is stron-
ger for democratic than for nondemocratic offender groups. Finally,
when a democratic group is held collectively responsible for an offense,
we predict that the value ascribed to democracy increases perceptions
of expectancy violation that consequently lead to a reduction in the
ascription of value to this group and thus to an increase of collective
punishment (Hypothesis 3). Such indirect effects are hypothesized to
be speciﬁc for democratic groups, and should not be evidenced among
nondemocratic groups.
Experiment 1 tested Hypothesis 1, and Experiments 2–5 the ﬁrst
two hypotheses bymanipulating collective responsibility and group po-
litical organization. A meta-analysis then tests the overall simple effects
evidenced in Experiments 2–5. Experiment 6 focused on high collective
responsibility conditions in order to test Hypothesis 3. In all studies, par-
ticipants were presented with an offense committed by somemembers
of a group. Subsequently, they were asked to indicate their support for
the collective punishment of that group. In the ﬁrst three experiments,
the offense was an act of plagiarism, whereas the other experiments
used more violent offenses such as aggressive acts during an ice hockey
game (Experiments 4 & 6) and acts of vandalism (Experiment 5). Sup-
port for collective punishment was the main dependent variable in all
experiments. Experiment 6 additionally assessed perceived expectancy
violations and offender group value, and support for the group leader
punishment as an additional dependent variable.Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was conducted using a case of plagiarism and varying
levels of collective responsibility in order to verify that collective
responsibility increases collective punishment.Sample and procedure
Thirty-nine university students were individually recruited in the
facilities of a large Swiss University (22 women and 17 men). Their ages
ranged from 18 to 31 years (M= 22.21, SD= 2.76). Participants were
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions (collective
responsibility: low versus high).
Participants were given a booklet in which they read that the exper-
imenters were interested in their opinion concerning a dilemma. They
were told that, during a seminar, a student group was evaluated collec-
tively through a group assignment. However, one of the students found
an article on the Internet that was highly relevant for their work and, in
order tomaximize the group's chances of success, included some impor-
tant sections of this article in their paper before handing it to the profes-
sor. Given that this is an obvious case of plagiarism, that the assignment
was a collective task, and that the group needed to be evaluated collec-
tively, participants were asked whether the entire group should be
punished as a consequence of this misdeed.Independent variable
Collective responsibility was experimentally manipulated. In the low
collective responsibility condition, the plagiarizer had not informed
the other group members who remained unaware of the plagiarism.
In the high collective responsibility condition, the plagiarizer had in-
formed the others about his deeds before handing in the report. All
group members were therefore aware of the plagiarism, although only
one of them actually committed the misdeed, and none reacted to it.Manipulation check
Five items measured perceived collective responsibility. ‘To what
extent do you think that the students who did not commit the
plagiarism …?’: were responsible of the assignment, were aware of the
plagiarism, passively supported the plagiarizer, collaborated in some way
with the plagiarizer to commit the plagiarism, are co-responsible for the
plagiarism (from 1 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘absolutely’; α= .79).
Collective punishment
After the description of the plagiarism, participants were reminded
that the assignment was a collective one and that the professor needed
to evaluate the group as a whole. Support for collective punishmentwas
then assessed through one item: ‘Beyond the punishment applied to
the plagiarizer, to what extent should the entire group be punished?’
(from 1 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘harshly’).
Results and discussion
All descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1 (manipulation
checks) and Table 2 (support for collective punishment). As expected,
the perception of collective responsibility was higher in the high collec-
tive responsibility condition than in the low collective responsibility
condition, p b .001, d= 1.49, indicating that the experimental manipu-
lationworked as expected.Moreover, support for collective punishment
was higher when collective responsibility was high rather than low,
p= .002, d = 1.07. This ﬁrst experiment experimentally showed that
collective responsibility increased support for collective punishment.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 additionallymanipulated the plagiarizer's group polit-
ical organization. In addition to the effect of collective responsibility, we
expected a collective responsibility by offender group political organiza-
tion interaction effect on support for collective punishment: The effect
of collective responsibility should be stronger for democratic groups
than for nondemocratic ones.
Method
Sample and design
Ninety-ﬁve students of a large Swiss university (40 women and 55
men; ages ranging from 18 to 32 years, M = 23.37, SD = 2.3) were
recruited on campus and asked to answer a written questionnaire.
Theywere randomly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (collective
responsibility: low, high) × 2 (group political organization: democratic,
nondemocratic) experimental design. As this experimentwas very sim-
ilar to Experiment 1, only differences will be mentioned hereafter.
Independent variables
We manipulated offender group political organization by initially
informing participants that a professor investigated how student groups
self-organize in order to carry out collective tasks such as writing up
group assignments. His studies allegedly evidenced two main types of
groups: egalitarian and hierarchical. Participants read that “Some
groups function in an egalitarian way. They collectively designate a stu-
dent as the group ‘leader’who is responsible for the coordination of the
group's work. Important decisions are made (and disagreements are
resolved) during discussions in which all group members participate.
Some other groups function in a hierarchical way. A student spontane-
ously assumes the coordination of group work. Important decisions
are made (and disagreements are resolved) by this ‘leader’without dis-
cussion with other group members”.
After that, participants were told that the current research focused
on their opinion concerning a situation that occurred during a seminar
Table 1
Marginal means and standard deviations for manipulation checks in Experiments 1 through 5.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 Experiment 5
Political organization
(D = democratic, ND = nondemocratic)
D ND D ND D ND D ND
Group political organization 3.87
(2.19)
5.34
(1.97)
3.09
(2.26)
5.55
(1.70)
2.56
(2.12)
6.13
(1.43)
– –
Collective responsibility
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
Perceived collective responsibility 3.43
(1.08)
4.93
(0.93)
3.00
(1.07)
5.05
(1.18)
3.01
(1.26)
3.75
(1.40)
4.44
(.90)
5.06
(1.01)
3.02
(1.11)
3.78
(1.18)
Group entitativity – – 3.63
(.93)
4.32
(1.02)
– – – –
Note. Dashes (–) refer to data that is not reported because it was not measured.
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contained the manipulation of the political organization of the group:
“By the way, the group in question was an egalitarian [a hierarchical]
group.”
Manipulation checks
Perceived collective responsibility (α= .84) was measured as in the
pilot study. A ﬁnal question assessed whether the group political organi-
zation was correctly perceived: “To what extent was the group in
question…?”: from 1 = ‘egalitarian’ to 7 = ‘hierarchical’.
Results
A 2 (collective responsibility: low, high) by 2 (political organization:
democratic, nondemocratic) ANOVA was performed on perceptions of
collective responsibility and group political organization (manipulation
checks), and on support for collective punishment (dependent
variable). All descriptive data are provided in Tables 1 (manipulation
checks) and 2 (support for collective punishment), and Fig. 1 displays
the results on support for collective punishment.
Manipulation checks
Collective responsibilitywas perceived as higher in the high collective
responsibility condition than in the low collective responsibility,
F(1, 90)= 86.64, p b .001, ηp2 = .49. Additionally, the political organiza-
tion by collective responsibility interaction effect was signiﬁcant,
F(1, 90)= 11.38, p= .001,ηp2= .11. The effect of collective responsibility
was signiﬁcant both in the democratic condition, t(90) = 8.76, p b .001,
and in the nondemocratic condition, t(90) = 4.29, p b .001. However,
in the low responsibility condition, perceived responsibility tended toTable 2
Means and standard deviations for support for collective punishment in Experiments 1
through 5 as a function of collective responsibility (low vs. high) and group political orga-
nization (democratic vs. nondemocratic). Means not sharing subscripts differ at least at
p b .05.
Collective responsibility
Low High
Experiment 1 2.78 (1.48)a 4.33 (1.43)b
Group political organization
Democratic Nondemocratic
Collective responsibility
Low High Low High
Experiment 2 2.45 (1.40)a 5.00 (1.61)b 2.65 (1.50)a 3.88 (1.51)c
Experiment 3 2.5 (1.69)a 3.54 (2.02)b 2.58 (1.35)a 2.24 (1.45)a
Experiment 4 4.03 (1.40)a 5.77 (1.34)b 5.05 (1.70)b 5.19 (1.62)b
Experiment 5 3.16 (1.26)a 3.74 (1.1)b 3.73 (1.22)b 3.22 (.92)abe higher for the nondemocratic group than for the democratic group,
t(90) = 1.68, p = .096, whereas the reverse effect was signiﬁcant in
the high responsibility condition, t(90) = 3.15, p = .002. In other
words, the effect of collective responsibility was polarized for democratic
groups. Themain effect of group political organizationwas not signiﬁcant
(p= .38).
Concerning the manipulation of group political organization, the
offender group was, as expected, perceived as more hierarchical in the
nondemocratic group condition than in the democratic group condition,
F(1, 91)= 11.68, p= .001, ηp2 = .11. Neither the collective responsibil-
ity nor the interaction effects were signiﬁcant (all ps N .84).
Collective punishment
A more severe collective punishment was overall supported when
collective responsibility was high rather than low, F(1, 90) = 35.56,
p b .001, ηp2 = .29. Furthermore, the predicted collective responsibility
by group political organization interaction effect was signiﬁcant,
F(1, 90) = 4.44, p= .038, ηp2 = .05: The effect of collective responsi-
bility was stronger when the offender groupwas democratic, t(90)=
−5.63, p b .001, rather thannondemocratic, t(90)=−2.85, p b .005. In
addition, at high levels of collective responsibility, participants inﬂicted
a more severe collective punishment upon the democratic group than
the nondemocratic group, t(90) = 2.64, p = .01. The main effect of
group political organization was not signiﬁcant (p= .148).
Discussion
This experiment ﬁrst showed that collective punishment increased
as collective responsibility increased. Results also provide support for
the second hypothesis: the effect of collective responsibility on collec-
tive punishment was stronger for the democratic offender group than
for the nondemocratic one.Moreover, offender group political organiza-
tion moderated the effect of collective responsibility on perceived
collective responsibility in such away that the democratic group organi-
zation polarized the effect of the experimentally induced collective re-
sponsibility. This effect is in line with our theoretical assumption as
perceptions of responsibility are more meaningful for actions commit-
ted by democratic groups as compared to nondemocratic ones. Howev-
er, this effect constitutes a methodological limitation that we address in
the next experiment by manipulating collective responsibility without
providing explicit information about the group behavior regarding the
offense. Additionally, the potential mediating effect of perceptions of
collective responsibility is investigated in Experiment 6 (see below).
Experiment 3
In order to manipulate collective responsibility without explicitly
providing information about group members' implication in the plagia-
rism act, this study focused on group entitativity (Yzerbyt, Judd, &
Fig. 1. Support for collective punishment as a function of the offender group collective responsibility andpolitical organization, Experiments 2 through5. Error bars represent 1 standard error.
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intimacy, common tasks, shared social category membership and
overall association result in different levels of perceived group
entitativity (Lickel et al., 2000). Furthermore, group entitativity in-
creases the attribution of shared responsibility for an offender's action
(Lickel et al., 2003) and of ensuing collective blame (Denson, Lickel,
Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006). Finally, group entitativity also in-
creases the propensity of retaliating against an outgroup following a
hostile act of one of its members (i.e., vicarious retribution; Gaertner &
Iuzzini, 2005; Gaertner, Iuzzini, & O'Mara, 2008; Lickel, Miller,
Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006; Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, &
Miller, 2008), the propensity of inﬂicting collective treatments in gener-
al (Alter & Darley, 2009), and of collective punishment in particular
(Newheiser, Sawaoka, & Dovidio, 2012). Accordingly, we reasoned
that group entitativity might constitute an indirect way to experimen-
tally manipulate collective responsibility without explicitly relating
the group to the offense. We expected high levels of group entitativity
to increase perceived collective responsibility independently of the
group political organization. Accordingly, in this experiment, we tested
our second hypothesis expecting a group entitativity by political organi-
zation interaction effect.
Method
Sample and design
Ninety-seven students of a large Swiss University (52women and 45
men; ages ranging from 19 to 31 years,M= 22.79, SD= 2.26) recruit-
ed in the university facilities were randomly assigned to one of the four
experimental conditions in a 2 (group entitativity: low, high) ×2 (group
political organization: democratic, nondemocratic) design. Again, the
same materials were used (plagiarism case). Therefore, we will hereaf-
ter only describe the differences with previous experiments.
Independent variables
We manipulated offender group political organizationwith the same
materials and procedure as in Experiment 2, and group entitativitywas
manipulated immediately thereafter. Following Lickel et al. (2000),
the low group entitativity condition read that “members of this group
were students who had not found a group yet, and gathered together
randomly”, whereas the high entitativity condition stated that “mem-
bers of this group were all part of the same football team, and gathered
together out of afﬁnity”.
Manipulation checks
Five items measured perceived group entitativity: Members of this
group may function in the same way across different situations, have
similar opinions, organize in a different way (reversed score), be similarto each other, and function differently from each other (reversed score)
(α= .66). Perceived collective responsibility was assessed as in Experi-
ment 2 (α= .81).
Results
Manipulation checks
Perceived group entitativitywas higher in the high entitativity condi-
tion than in the low entitativity condition, F(1, 93) = 11.59, p= .001,
ηp2 = .11. Neither the political organization main effect nor the interac-
tion effect was signiﬁcant (p's N .72). Furthermore, the offender group
was perceived as more collectively responsible in the high entitativity
condition than in the low entitativity condition, F(1, 93) = 7.33, p =
.008, ηp2 = .07. Neither the group political organization main effect nor
the interaction effect was signiﬁcant (ps N .62). Overall, these results
indicate that this new manipulation was successful.
The offender group was seen as more hierarchical in the nondemo-
cratic group condition than in the democratic group condition,
F(1, 92)= 37.24, p b .001,ηp2= .29. Themain effect of group entitativity
was not signiﬁcant (p= .29), and the interaction effect was marginally
signiﬁcant, F(1, 92) = 3.68, p= .058, ηp2 = .04.
Collective punishment
Results showed amarginally signiﬁcantmain effect of group political
organization, F(1, 93) = 3.31, p = .072, ηp2 = .03. The main effect of
entitativity was not signiﬁcant (p= .30), but the predicted group polit-
ical organization by group entitativity interaction effect was, F(1, 93)=
4.28, p = .041, ηp2 = .04: the democratic offender group was more
severely punished in the high entitativity condition than in the low
entitativity condition, t(93) = 2.19, p= .031, whereas the nondemo-
cratic offender group was punished to the same extent in both condi-
tions (p = .47). At high levels of group entitativity, support for
collective punishment was higher for the democratic group than for
the nondemocratic group, t(93) = 2.76, p = .003, whereas no differ-
ence emerged when group entitativity was low (p= .86).
Discussion
This experiment used a different operationalization of collective
responsibility by providing only information on group entitativity. As
expected, and consistentwith prior research (Lickel et al., 2000), a high-
ly cohesive group (a sports team)was perceived as having higher levels
of entitativity and as being more collectively responsible for its mem-
bers' behavior than a randomly formedgroup. Furthermore, thepredict-
ed group entitativity by group political organization interaction effect
was signiﬁcant: democratic groups were more harshly punished when
they were highly entitative (i.e., highly collectively responsible), but
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the group was nondemocratic.
Experiment 4
In order to provide convergent validity to our ﬁndings, we conduct-
ed another experiment using a different misdeed: an aggression perpe-
trated by fan club members during an ice-hockey game. With this new
paradigm, we again manipulated collective responsibility in a straight-
forward way. Group political organization was also manipulated, and
support for collective punishment was again our main dependent
variable. In line with our second hypothesis, we predicted a collective
responsibility by group political organization interaction effect on sup-
port for collective punishment.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were recruited in several public areas in Switzerland
(on the University campus, in train stations, etc.). Out of the 107 partic-
ipants, 61 were female (57%). Their ages ranged from 18 to 82, with a
mean of 30.62 (SD = 14.15). Fifty of them were students. They were
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions in a 2
(collective responsibility: low, high) × 2 (group political organization:
democratic, nondemocratic) design.
Procedure
Participants read that a purported professor had observed two types
of groups, egalitarian and hierarchical, thatwere described as in theﬁrst
two studies. Thereafter, participants read a ﬁctitious scenario describing
an incident that occurred during an ice-hockey game: twomembers of a
fan club, taking advantage of the low visibility provoked by smoke
devices, threwprojectiles at rival fans. As a result, two fans of the oppos-
ing team were severely injured.
Independent variables
The manipulation of offender group political organizationwas similar
to the one used in the previous studies: Participants read that the fan
club was organized in an egalitarian versus hierarchicalway.
Collective responsibilitywas manipulated at the moment the aggres-
sionwas described. Participants read that the police investigated this in-
cident and that their report stated either that the investigation revealed
several “contradictory reports, because of which it is not possible to be
certain whether the other members of the group actually contributed
to the aggression by facilitating or encouraging it” (low responsibility
condition), or “consistent reports making it clear that the other mem-
bers of the group contributed to the aggression by facilitating and
encouraging it” (high responsibility condition).
Manipulation checks
As ameasure of perceived collective responsibility adapted to the new
scenario, participants indicated the extent to which they perceived that
other group members: knew who the aggressors were, passively support-
ed the aggression, facilitated the aggression, encouraged the aggression,
should have prevented the aggression, should have done everything to
identify and denounce the aggressors, and are co-responsible for the
aggression on a one to seven scale (1 = not at all, 7 = completely;
α= .77). In addition, on a seven-point bipolar scale from egalitarian
to hierarchical, participants indicated the type of organization of the
fan club that they just read about.
Collective punishment
Support for collective punishment was measured with one item on a
seven-point scale (1= not at all, 7 = completely): to what extent should
all other group members be punished in one way or another?Results
Manipulation checks
Results revealed that collective responsibility was perceived to be
higher in the high responsibility condition than in the low responsibility
condition, F(1, 102) = 10.19, p b .002, ηp2 = .09. No other effects were
signiﬁcant (all ps N .28). Democratic groups were perceived to be
more egalitarian than nondemocratic groups, F(1, 102) = 106.73,
p b .001, ηp2 = .51. No other effects were signiﬁcant (all ps N .15).
Support for collective punishment
Support for collective punishment was higher at high levels of
collective responsibility (M = 5.43, SD = 1.52) than at low levels
(M= 4.46, SD= 1.60), F(1, 102) = 9.81, p= .002, ηp2 = .09. The pre-
dicted interaction effect was signiﬁcant as well, F(1, 102) = 7.07, p =
.009, ηp2 = .07. The democratic offender group was more severely
punished at high than at low levels of collective responsibility,
t(102) = 4.07, p b .001, whereas this difference was not observed for
the nondemocratic offender group, p= .74. In addition, when collective
responsibility was low, the nondemocratic group was more harshly
punished than the democratic group, t(102)= 2.37, p b .02, but no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant difference appeared when collective responsibility
was high, t(102) = 1.39, p b .17.
Discussion
Theﬁndings of Experiment 4 showed again that the predicted collec-
tive responsibility by group political organization interactionwas signif-
icant. A more severe treatment of democratic groups appeared in the
high responsibility condition as compared to the low responsibility con-
dition, whereas this was not the case for nondemocratic groups.
Experiment 5
To provide supplementary external validity to the results obtained
so far, Experiment 5 examined the effect of collective responsibility
and group political organization in a paradigm describing a case of van-
dalism (see Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007). We additionally included a
more reliable measure of support for collective punishment, replacing
the one-item measure with a multi-item scale.
Method
Participants
One hundred and forty-eight participants from a large Swiss univer-
sity (76 women and 72 men; ages ranging from 18 to 64 years, M =
31.03, SD= 9.79) were recruited in university facilities and randomly
assigned to one of four experimental conditions of a 2 (collective re-
sponsibility: low, high) by 2 (group political organization: democratic,
nondemocratic) design.
Procedure
The paradigm is similar to that used in Falomir-Pichastor et al.
(2007). Participants were informed that scientiﬁc research had investi-
gated spontaneous group organization among young people participat-
ing in summer camps and evidenced two main types of internal
organization of groups: hierarchical and egalitarian that were described
as in the previous studies.
Participants were then told that the experimenters were interested
in their opinion concerning an incident that supposedly occurred during
one of these camps. The residents of a nearby village complained about
the presence of noisy teenagers and asked the authorities to shut down
the camp. A few days later, two group members went to the village,
sprayed grafﬁti on facades, broke windows, insulted a resident
and stole items from the local supermarket. The culprits, hooded,
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summer camp.
Independent variables
Offender group political organization was manipulated when the
vandalism incident was described: Participants read that the group
was egalitarian or hierarchical.
Collective responsibility was manipulated by telling participants that
the wrongdoers were not identiﬁed either because the other members
of the group did not know their identity (low responsibility condition)
or because they knew their identity, but decided to cover up for them
(high responsibility condition).
Manipulation check
Six items measured perceived collective responsibility: The other
group members directly contributed to the aggression, indirectly contrib-
uted to the aggression, knew the offenders' intention, could have prevented
the offense, should have known the offenders' intention, and knew the
offenders' identity but would not denounce them (1 = not at all, 7 =
completely; α= .81). No manipulation check was introduced for the
group political organization in the present study, given that this manipu-
lation proved itself efﬁcient in the previous studies.
Collective punishment
Participantswereﬁnally asked to indicate their support for collective
punishment with 8 items. Given that the actual wrongdoers were not
identiﬁed, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which all
members of the group should: give back the stolen money, publicly apol-
ogize, do public service in the village, pay a compensation to the village, be
prohibited to leave their tent, leave the camp before its end, be prohibited to
participate in next camps, and be deprived from sport and play activities.
All itemswere aggregated into ameasure of support for collective punish-
ment (1 = not at all, 7 = absolutely; α= .75).
Results
Manipulation check
In the low responsibility condition, the offender group was
perceived as less responsible than in the high responsibility condition,
F(1, 144) = 16.18, p b .001, ηp2 = .10, indicating that our manipulation
was successful. The main effect of the offender group political organiza-
tion was marginally signiﬁcant, F(1, 144) = 3.37, p = .069, ηp2 = .02,
and the interaction term was not (p= .86).
Support for collective punishment
Neither the main effect of collective responsibility nor that of group
political organization was signiﬁcant (ps N .84), but the predicted col-
lective responsibility by political organization interaction effect was,
F(1, 144) = 8.70, p= .004, ηp2 = .06. As predicted, the democratic of-
fender group was more strongly punished in the high responsibility
condition than in the low responsibility condition, t(144) = 2.97,
p = .004. However, surprisingly, the nondemocratic offender group
was less punished in the high responsibility condition than in the low
responsibility condition, t(144) = 2.72, p= .007. We additionally ob-
served that in the low responsibility condition, support for collective
punishment was higher for the nondemocratic than for the democratic
group, t(144)= 2.11, p= .037, whereas in the high responsibility con-
dition, it was higher for the democratic than the nondemocratic group,
t(144) =−2.06, p= .041.
Discussion
The present experiment revealed again a signiﬁcant offender group
political organization by collective responsibility interaction. The
democratic group was punished more severely when its collectiveresponsibility was high rather than low, whereas this was not the case
for the nondemocratic group.
However, we observed an unexpected effect of collective responsi-
bility for the nondemocratic group that was actually less punished in
the high responsibility condition than in the low responsibility condi-
tion. This effect is at odds with previous research where responsibility
has constantly been related to higher levels of punishment, not lower
ones. An explanation for this ﬁnding might lie in inferences potentially
made by respondents when faced with a collectively responsible non-
democratic group: Collective punishments against nondemocratic
groups may be less meaningful in this “covering-the-offenders” scenar-
io (i.e., when group responsibility is high), because the authoritarian
functioning of the hierarchical group may lead observers to think that
group members were merely complying with their leaders' requests
(Milgram, 1974) rather than deliberately refusing to denounce the actu-
al culprits. Further research is needed to better understand this effect.
Meta-analysis
Across the last four experiments, we observe that democratic groups
were less collectively punished than nondemocratic groups at low
levels of collective responsibility, whereas they were more punished
at high levels of collective responsibility, but these simple effects were
not signiﬁcant in every experiment. Given that p-values are likely to
vary greatly around a true effect (Lai, Fidler, & Cumming, 2012), it
might well be that these are true effects that simply occasionally don't
reach the conventional threshold for signiﬁcance. In order to provide
the most trustworthy result, we conducted two meta-analyses on Ex-
periments 2 through 5 testing the overall signiﬁcance of the offender
group political organization effect on support for collective punishment
at low and high collective responsibility levels. Although these speciﬁc
differences were not directly part of our hypotheses (but are logically
derived from our hypotheses), they are theoretically meaningful and
interesting, and hence worth investigating further.
Results and discussion
Following the procedure recommended by Lipsey and Wilson
(2001) and Hedges and Olkin (1985), using a ﬁxed-effects model and
weighting studies according to sample size, we ﬁrst calculated each
study's effect size and inverse variance weight (see Table 3). We were
then able to calculate the average effect size and an associated p-value
across all studies. Results show that at low levels of collective responsi-
bility, group political organization has a reliable medium size effect on
support for collective punishment (d = .33, 95% conﬁdence interval
[CI] lower limit [LL] = .06, upper limit [UL] = .60, SE = .14, z = 2.37,
p = .018). At high levels of collective responsibility, group political
organization also has a reliablemedium size effect on support for collec-
tive punishment (d= .46, 95% CI LL= .20,UL= .72, SE= .13, z= 3.45,
p b .001). These results allow us to be conﬁdent about the existence of
these effects: At low levels of collective responsibility, support for col-
lective punishment is lower for democratic than for nondemocratic
groups, whereas at high levels of collective responsibility, support for
collective punishment is higher for democratic than for nondemocratic
groups.
Experiment 6
We have shown that democratic groups are more punished as a
function of their collective responsibility for a misdeed, whereas this is
less the case for nondemocratic groups. In addition, democratic groups
are less punished than nondemocratic ones at low levels of collective
responsibility, and more punished at high levels of collective responsi-
bility. While the difference due to the groups' political organization at
low levels of responsibility can easily be explained by the expression
of leniency towards valued democratic groups (Falomir-Pichastor
Table 3
Effect sizes and inverse variance weights of the effect of offender group political organization on support for collective punishment at low and high levels of collective responsibility, Ex-
periments 2 through 5 (meta-analysis).
Low collective responsibility High collective responsibility
Effect size Inverse variance weight Effect size Inverse variance weight
Experiment 2 0.13 10.67 0.56 12.26
Experiment 3 0.05 11.99 0.57 11.76
Experiment 4 0.56 12.22 0.28 12.92
Experiment 5 0.48 16.99 0.45 18.99
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ciﬁc processes accounting for the punishment of such groups at higher
levels of collective responsibility. First, we argue that the increase in
support for the collective punishment of democratic groups should be
observed in particular among people who ascribe a relatively higher so-
cial value to democracy. Second, we argue that the higher social value
ascribed to democratic groups comes with a price: higher expectations.
If a democratic group's conduct is evaluatedwith a higher standard than
a nondemocratic group's conduct, then a misdeed for which the entire
democratic group is responsible for (e.g. a misdeed for which it is
impossible to exonerate the group for) should represent a violation of
these heightened expectations. As a result, at high levels of collective re-
sponsibility, the greater punishment of democratic groups as compared
to nondemocratic groups should bemoderated by the value ascribed to
democracy (H3a), and mediated both by the perception of democratic
offender group expectancy violation and by the subsequent reduction
in the value attributed to this speciﬁc democratic offender group (a
serial mediation hypothesis — H3b). Such processes should not be
observed for nondemocratic groups, which are punished indifferently
of their collective responsibility for the misdeed.
Finally, if the predicted effects are indeed related to perceptions of
expectancy violation and to value judgments inferred from the group's
political organization, we contend that the same processes should
apply not only to the group as a whole, but also to the group leader.
We hence predicted an interaction effect between the group political
organization and respondents' valorization of democracy on support
for the group leader punishment (H4a), and a serial mediation effect
through group expectancy violation and group value (H4b).
We used the same paradigm as in Experiment 4 (aggressive behav-
ior during an ice-hockey game), manipulated group political organiza-
tion (democratic, nondemocratic) and kept collective responsibility
constant at a high level. In addition to the support for collective punish-
ment, we assessed valorization of democracy as a moderator of the
group political organization main effect, perceived expectancy viola-
tions and offender group social value as serial mediators, and support
for the punishment of the group leader as an additional dependent
variable.
We hence tested two serial mediated moderations: under high
collective responsibility, the effect of group political organization on
support for both collective and leader punishment should bemoderated
by respondents' valorization of democracy, such that the more people
value democracy, the more they should support punishment of the
democratic group and the democratic leader, whereas punishment of
the nondemocratic group and nondemocratic leader should not differ
according to respondents' level of valorization of democracy. Further-
more, these effects should be mediated sequentially by perceived
expectancy violations and perceived group value: taking these two var-
iables into account should signiﬁcantly reduce themoderation effect on
support for collective punishment and the indirect effect of these two
mediating variables should be signiﬁcant.
As a concurrent explanation of these processes, wemeasured collec-
tive responsibility and tested it as a mediator of the effect. It would
indeed also be possible that, independently of our experimental manip-
ulation,members of democratic groups are simply perceived as globally
more collectively responsible than nondemocratic group members,given their participative decision-making procedures, as was observed
in the present Experiment 2. Such a perception could explain that col-
lective responsibility has a stronger effect on democratic groups than
nondemocratic ones. Although such an understandingwas not support-
ed by Experiments 3 to 5, inwhich nomain effect of the group's political
organization on collective responsibility was found, this alternative ex-
planation was investigated in the present experiment in order to rule it
out more conﬁdently.
Method
Sample and design
Participants were 137 adults recruited through Amazon Mechanical
Turk and compensated for their participation with USD 0.40. Fifty
percent of them were female, their ages ranging from 18 to 80 (M =
34.27, SD= 12.34), and only 2 of them reported not being US citizens
(but were originally from India). Participants were randomly assigned
to one of the two conditions, where collective responsibility was kept
constant at a high level, and the group political organizationwasmanip-
ulated (democratic vs. nondemocratic).
Procedure
The procedure essentially replicated that from Experiment 4, with
the exception that collective responsibility was kept constant at a high
level.
Independent variables
Offender group political organization was manipulated by merely
mentioning that the group was identiﬁed by the professor as being
typically “egalitarian” (=democratic) or typically “hierarchical”
(=nondemocratic).
Valorization of democracy was measured with 8 items (see Pereira
et al., 2014). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which
they agreed with 8 statements in relation to democracy (e.g., I prefer
democracy over other forms of government, I value democracy as a political
system, people are happier when living in a democratic country as
compared to other forms of government, etc.) on a 1 (not at all) to 7
(absolutely) scale.
Manipulation checks
Perception of the group political organization was assessed through
one item: What was the organization of the group you just read
about? (1 = hierarchical, 7 = egalitarian).
Dependent variables
Support for collective punishmentwasmeasured through seven items.
Participants indicated on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (absolutely) scale the extent
to which they considered that all group members should: publicly apol-
ogize to the victims, publicly apologize to the sport authorities, complete
community service hours in the skating rink, contribute to the victims'med-
ical costs, be prohibited from entering the skating rink, be prohibited from
assisting any of their team's future games, and be prohibited from getting
together as a fan club.
Support for the leader punishment was measured through the same
items as the collective punishment, but participants indicated the
Table 4
Descriptive statistics and correlations for Experiment 6 variables. ** = p b .01, * = p b .05.
Variable M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Valorization of democracy 5.25 1.26 .93
2. Expectancy violation 5.68 1.09 .78 .04
3. Offender group value 2.29 1.04 .90 − .21* − .47**
4. Collective responsibility 5.36 1.18 .91 .09 .30** − .45**
5. Collective punishment 5.66 1.14 .82 .14 .23** − .56** .48**
6. Leader punishment 5.78 1.20 .88 .21* .29** − .53** .54** .73**
7. Group organization 3.71 2.69 − .07 .04 .12 .04 − .12 − .24**
1 Even though this question arose for Experiment 6, we have in fact the data to test this
alternative explanation in previous experiments as well. Moderated mediation models
were thus tested across all other experiments, investigating whether perceived collective
responsibility could mediate the effect of the group's political organization on support for
collective punishment, speciﬁcally at high levels of (manipulated) collective responsibili-
ty. Results appears to be supportive of this alternative explanation in Experiment 2 (the
indirect effect of perceived collective responsibility at high levels ofmanipulated collective
responsibility was signiﬁcant, B = − .27, SE = .11; 95% CI:− .54;− .09), but not in the
other four experiments (the tested indirect effects were not signiﬁcant. Experiment 3:
B= − .06, SE = .13, CI:− .35; .18; Experiment 4: B= − .02, SE = .09, CI:− .21; .13; Ex-
periment 5: B= − .09, SE= .07, CI:− .24; .03; Experiment 6: B= .03, SE= .06, CI:− .07;
.12). For this reason,we believe it is reasonable to dismiss perceived collective responsibil-
ity as an explanation for the effect of a group's political organization on support for collec-
tive punishment.
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the group leader. The last item was adapted and stated: “be excluded
from the fan club”.
Mediators
Collective responsibility. Participants indicated on a 1 (not at all) to 7
(absolutely) scale the extent to which they considered that the group
members other than the aggressors: knew the aggressors' identity, pas-
sively supported the aggression, encouraged the aggression, should have
prevented the aggression, are accountable for what happened, somehow
contributed to the aggression, are co-responsible for the aggression, should
be held morally responsible for what happened.
Expectancy violation. Participants were asked to indicate (compared to
other ice hockey fan clubs): did the group's behavior match what you
would expect (reverse coded), did the group's behavior violate any expec-
tations you might have had about how fan-club supporters should behave,
how typical was the group's behavior (reverse coded), should they have
known better, and if participants expected more from this group. These 5
items were aggregated into a measure of expectancy violation (from 1
— not at all to 7 — absolutely).
Offender group value. Participants were asked to indicate, on a 1 (not at
all) to 7 (absolutely) scale, the extent to which they considered the
members of this fan club as: moral, bad (reverse coded), fair, honest,
respectful, good people, violent (reverse coded), and trustworthy.
Results
Descriptive statistics, alpha values and correlations for all measured
variables are provided in Table 4. In preparation for the test of our full
model, all variables (manipulation checks, dependent variables, and
mediators)were separately regressed on amodel including group polit-
ical organization (democratic=−1, and nondemocratic=1), valoriza-
tion of democracy (standardized score), and the interaction term
between these two variables.
Manipulation checks
The overall model tested on perceived group political organization
was signiﬁcant, F(1, 116) = 56.02, p b .001, R2 = .59, as was the main
effect of group political organization, B = −2.07, t(116) = 12.91,
p b .001. This effect revealed that in the nondemocratic group condition
(M = 5.68, SE = .22), the group was perceived as more hierarchical
than in the democratic group condition (M= 1.53, SE= .23), indicating
that the manipulation of group political organization was effective. No
other effects were signiﬁcant (ps N .6).
Dependent variables
On support for collective punishment, the overall model was signiﬁ-
cant, F(1, 116)= 2.78, p= .044, R2= .07, as was the predicted interac-
tion effect, B= −.23, t(116)=−2.09, p= .039. No other effects were
signiﬁcant, although the effect of valorization of democracy was mar-
ginally signiﬁcant, B= .20, t(116) = 1.85, p= .067. Simple slope anal-
yses indicated that valorization of democracy indeed increased supportfor collective punishment when the offender group was democratic,
B= .41, t(116) = 2.68, p= .009, but not when it was nondemocratic,
B= −.03, t(116) = −.18, p= .861.
On support for the leader punishment, the overall model was signiﬁ-
cant, F(1, 116) 7.23, p b .001, R2 = .16. The main effect of the political
organization was signiﬁcant, B = .30, t(116) = 3.07, p= .003, as was
the main effect of valorization of democracy, B = .30, t(116) = 3.01,
p = .003, and both effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction,
B = −.25, t(116) =−2.52, p = .013. Simple slope analyses revealed
the same pattern of ﬁndings that was observed on support for collective
punishment: Valorization of democracy increased support for the pun-
ishment of the group leader when the offender group was democratic,
B = .54, t(116) = 3.76, p b .001, but not when it was nondemocratic,
B= .05, t(116) = .36, p= .717.
Mediators
In preparation for the mediation analyses, we separately tested the
same model on each of the potential mediators: collective responsibili-
ty, violation of expectations, and offender group value.
Collective responsibility. The overall modelwas non-signiﬁcant, F(1, 116)
1.2, p= .309, and none of the factors entered in themodel were signif-
icant (ps from .117 to .604). For this reason, collective responsibilitywas
no longer considered as a potential mediator in the followingmediation
analyses1.
Expectancy violation. Although the overall model did not reach conven-
tional signiﬁcance levels, F(1, 116) 1.81, p= .150, R2= .05, the predict-
ed interaction did, B = −.23, t(116) =−2.27, p= .025. Simple slope
analyses revealed the same pattern of ﬁndings that was observed on
punishment judgments: valorization of democracy increased percep-
tions of violations of expectations when the offender group was demo-
cratic, B = .29, t(116) = 2.00, p = .048, but not when it was
nondemocratic, B= −.16, t(116) =−1.18, p= .239.
Group value. The overall model was signiﬁcant, F(1, 116) = 6.33,
p b .001, R2 = .147. The main effects of group political organization,
B= −.21, t(116)=−2.30, p= .023, and of valorization of democracy,
B = −.27, t(116) = −2.91, p = .004, were signiﬁcant. These main
effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction, B = .28, t(116) =
2.99, p = .003: When valorization of democracy increased, the per-
ceived group value of the democratic group decreased, B = − .53,
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remained unchanged, B = .01, t(119) = .06, p = .953, a pattern of
ﬁndings that mirrors those evidenced on judgments of (collective and
leader) punishments and expectancy violation.
Mediation analyses
Support for collective punishment. Our hypothesis was that the interac-
tion effect between offender group organization and democracy valori-
zation on support for collective punishmentwould bemediated both by
perceived expectancy violations and by the social value ascribed to the
offender group. A serial mediation model tested this prediction.
To test themodel of themediating effect of expectancy violation and
group value on the interaction effect of the group organization by valo-
rization of democracy on support for collective punishment and leader
punishment, we ran the model 6 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013)
with two serialmediators. The independent variablewas the interaction
term between group political organization and respondents' valoriza-
tion of democracy, the dependent variable was support for collective
punishment, mediator 1 was expectancy violation and mediator 2 was
group value.We also included themain effects of group political organi-
zation and valorization of democracy as covariates. If valorization of
democracy increases the support for collective punishment of the
offending democratic group (when it is highly collectively responsible
for an offense) because of expectancy violationswhich, in turn, decrease
the value ascribed to the offending group, then the serial indirect effect
of the interaction term on support for collective punishment through
expectancy violations and group value should be signiﬁcant.
As indicated in Fig. 2, the total indirect effect was signiﬁcant
(standardized effect: B = − .17; SE = .07; 90% CI: − .30; − .06), as
was the serial indirect effect through both mediators, with a standard-
ized point estimate of B =− .05 (SE = .03; 90% CI:− .12;− .01). The
simple indirect effect through expectancy violation was not signiﬁcant
(B=− .003; SE= .02; 90% CI:− .05; .03)2. This indicates that the effect
of expectancy violation on support for collective punishment is entirely
mediated by the second serialmediator: group value. Indeed, the simple
indirect effect through group value was signiﬁcant, with a standardized
point estimate of B=− .11 (SE= .06; 90% CI:− .21;− .02).
Support for leader punishment.We also tested this model on support for
leader punishment (see Fig. 3), arguing that a group leader should be
punished according to his group's perceived value, as inferred by its po-
litical organization. Interestingly, all indirect effects were signiﬁcant
(total effect: B= −.15; SE= .06; 90% CI:− .27;− .07; serial indirect ef-
fect: B=− .04; SE= .02; 90% CI:− .10;− .01; expectancy violation ef-
fect: B=− .03; SE=.03; 90%CI:− .11;− .0002; groupvalue effect: B=
− .08; SE= .04; 90% CI:− .17;− .02), and the effect of group political
organization remained signiﬁcant (B= .21, t= 2.31, p= .022). This in-
dicates that although perceptions of violation of expectations and group
value account for some of the variance explaining the support for the
punishment of the group leader, its political organization also directly
contributes to leader punishment. Overall, this result provides further
empirical evidence in support for our understanding of the retributive
judgments in terms of value judgments.
Discussion
The ﬁndings of the serial mediation analyses in Experiment 6
showed that, when the offending group was collectively responsible
for an offense, democracy valorization increased support for the2 It should be noted that when tested separately, bothmediators signiﬁcantlymediated
the effect of the group organization by valorization of democracy interaction on support
for collective punishment. The indirect effect of expectancy violation was signiﬁcant,
B= .06 (SE= .04; 90% CI:− .14;− .01). The indirect effect of group value was also signif-
icant, B= − .16 (SE = .07; 90% CI:− .29;− .06).collective punishment of a democratic group, and of its leader. Further-
more, these effects were driven by expectancy violationswhich, in turn,
led to a decrease in the value ascribed to the offending group. Ultimate-
ly, such decrease in group value increased the willingness to punish the
entire group and its leader for the misconduct of a few of its members.
This result indicates that, for peoplewho value democracy, a democratic
offender group violates their initial expectancies and thus betrays the
social value attached to its political organization. Such disappointment
and decrease in the democratic group's value subsequently translates
into higher collective punishment. Results on the support for the
group leader punishment further support this interpretation: The pro-
cesses related to the judgments following the offense of democratic
groupmembers are rooted in the value ascribed to the group and infuse
many different justice judgments in a similar way: the group leader as
well as the whole group is punished because the misdeed is perceived
as violating prior expectations held towards democratic groups, which
in turn decreases the value ascribed to it.
These effects were not found for the nondemocratic group: Valoriza-
tion of democracy predicted neither collective punishment, expectancy
violation, nor group value. This indicates that a nondemocratic group is
punished independently of perceptions of expectancy violations or of
social value. Given that, prior to any offense, nondemocratic groups
are less valued than democratic groups, it is not surprising that expecta-
tions towards those groups are lower and hence less violated following
the observation of a misdeed.
Perceptions of collective responsibility appeared not to differ as a
function of the group political organization, respondents' valorization
of democracy, or the interaction between these two factors. Naturally
it is likely that, in the absence of any information regarding groupmem-
bers' responsibility, thedemocratic groupmemberswould beheldmore
collectively responsible than nondemocratic groups, given the nature of
such groups' organization. In our experiment however, we made it ex-
plicit that all group members contributed to the wrongdoing, making
it clear that group members of both types of groups were to be held
morally responsible. For this reason, in this experiment we expected
perceived collective responsibility not to vary as a function of the stud-
ied factors, and hence not to account for the differences on support for
collective punishment.
General discussion
What factors trigger the willingness to inﬂict collective punishment,
knowing that innocent individuals would suffer the consequences of a
wrongdoing that they did not commit themselves? Following prior stud-
ies (Cushman et al., 2012; Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007), the present
research experimentally demonstrated that collective responsibility in-
creases support for collective punishment, and that this effect is moder-
ated by the target group's political organization. The present paper
reported six experiments inwhichwe investigated the effects of offender
group responsibility and political organization on support for its collec-
tive punishment as a response to a misdeed committed by some group
members. Although only one, or a few, groupmembers actually commit-
ted the wrongdoing, we manipulated the extent to which the rest of the
group could be held accountable for this wrongdoing. Experiment 1
showed that higher levels of collective responsibility led to increased
levels of support for collective punishment. Experiments 2 to 5 consis-
tently showed that theoffender group's political organizationmoderated
this effect: Whereas support for collective punishment of democratic
groups constantly increased as their collective responsibility did, this
was less the case for nondemocratic groups for which collective respon-
sibility generally did not affect collective punishment. Finally, Experi-
ment 6 provided a better understanding of the processes underlying
these effects with a serial mediation analysis through expectancy viola-
tions and decreased group value.
Taken together, these studies show how a group can be punished on
the sole basis of a moral responsibility attributed to all of its members
Indirect Effects
Standardized 
Indirect Effect 
(Bootstrapped SE)
Bootstrapped 90% 
Confidence Intervals
Interaction Expectancy violation Support 
for collective punishment
-.003 (.02) -.05 to .03
Interaction Group value Support for 
collective punishment
-.11 (.06) -.21 to -.02
Interaction Expectancy violation Group 
value Support for collective punishment
-.05 (.03) -.12 to -.01
Total Indirect Effect -.17 (.07) -.30 to -.06
Fig. 2. Standardized regressionweights and indirect effects for the serialmediation of the effect of the interaction between group organization andpreference for democracy on support for
collective punishment through perceptions of expectancy violation and group value, Experiment 6. *** = p b .001, ** = p b .01, * = p b .05.
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and how the group's political organization moderates the inﬂuence of
such collective responsibility on support for collective punishment. A
democratic offender group, if perceived as collectively responsible for
amisdeed, is perceived to be violating thehigh standards held by people
who value democracy. This, in turn, decreases the value ascribed to the
democratic group, ultimately leading to an increased willingness to
punish such group. These processes are speciﬁc to democratic groups,
as opposed to nondemocratic ones, and to people who strongly value
democracy, as opposed to people who consider democracy less as a
value. These ﬁndings were evidenced with three scenarios varying the
nature of the offense (plagiarism, hooliganism, and vandalism), the
kind of collective responsibility (knowing about themisdeed and failing
to act, facilitating the emergence of the misdeed, knowing who the cul-
prits are) and the measure of support for collective punishment (going
from a single-itemmeasure in Experiments 1 to 4 to a multi-item scale
in Experiments 5 and 6).
Contrary to prior research showing that people aremotivated to pro-
tect democratic groups from punishment (Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira,
et al., 2012; Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007; Pereira et al., 2014), thepresent research evidenced situations in which people demonstrate
more severity in their retributive judgments directed at democratic
groups. These ﬁndings are consistent with other studies showing that
democratic groups are not always protected from punishment, as com-
pared to nondemocratic ones, for example in situations where the vic-
tim group is also democratic or unspeciﬁed (Falomir-Pichastor et al.,
2007; Staerklé, Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, & Butera, in preparation).
Similarly, wrongful actions perpetrated by democratic groups such as
military interventions are no longer legitimizedwhen they are conduct-
ed without popular support or against another democratic state
(Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, et al., 2012). In the same vein, research in-
vestigating attitudes towards human death toll in the context of the in-
vasion of Iraq evidenced ethnocentric attitudeswhen the lives of valued
group members (i.e., those of American co-nationals and allies) were
opposed to lives of devalued outgroupmembers (i.e., those of Iraqi peo-
ple), but not when two valued groups competed with each other
(Pratto, 2006). In all these situations, the democratic group is penalized
for disavowing the democratic values that it is expected to represent: a
democratic group should respect its public opinion and know better
than to use violence to resolve conﬂicts (Staerklé et al., 1998), especially
Indirect Effects
Standardized 
Indirect Effect 
(Bootstrapped SE)
Bootstrapped 90% 
Confidence Intervals
Interaction Expectancy violation 
Support for leader punishment
-.03 (.03) -.11 to -.0002
Interaction Group value Support for  
leader punishment
-.08 (.04) -.17 to -.02
Interaction Expectancy violation Group 
value Support for  leader punishment
-.04 (.02) -.10 to -.01
Total Indirect Effect -.15 (.06) -.27 to -.07
Fig. 3. Standardized regressionweights and indirect effects for the serialmediation of the effect of the interaction between group organization andpreference for democracy on support for
leader punishment through perceptions of expectancy violation and group value. *** = p b .001, ** = p b .01, * = p b .05.
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to show the crucial role of these higher expectations held towards dem-
ocratic groups and their consequences on retributive judgments follow-
ing the violation of such expectations.
Our ﬁndings also evidence a situation in which a basic justice princi-
ple is not applied: in three of the experiments, collective responsibility
did not increase the nondemocratic group's collective punishment. Peo-
ple are willing to punish those groups (more than democratic ones) on
the sole basis of their lower group value, but do not take their level of
responsibility into account when making retributive judgments. These
effects mirror those of other studies showing that offenders' character-
istics (e.g., in- or outgroup member, high or low status group member)
have amoderating impact on justice judgments such as offense severity,
offender intentionality and offender guilt (Gollwitzer & Keller, 2010;
Karelaia & Keck, 2013; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010; van Prooijen, 2006).
As for these studies, one possible explanation for the observed effects
might be that nondemocratic groups are excluded from the scope of
justicewithinwhich those basic justice principles determine retributive
judgments. Scopes of justice (or moral communities; Cohen, 1991)determine the expectations and behavioral standards when judging
others, and different levels of expectations are set for offenders belong-
ing to one scope of justice or another. Moreover, their existence has
been evidenced in reference to outgroups as compared to ingroups for
distributive justice decisions (Opotow, 1990). Hence, given that collec-
tive responsibility only appears to determine collective punishment
for democratic groups, it might be that nondemocratic groups are, by
default, excluded from the moral community because they violate im-
portant democratic values. Future research should investigate whether
such exclusion effects are related to value-violating groups or low-
status groups in general and how exactly they operate.
Overall, these results shed light on political intergroup perceptions
and reveal how citizens form judgments about the fairness and legiti-
macy of international events. Surprisingly enough, this research evi-
denced conditions under which individuals accept the punishment of
valued innocent people, namely when collective responsibility is high
and the offender group is democratically organized. Democratic groups
therefore pay a price for their higher value: people expect them to be-
have properly, and when they don't, they face the risk of being
16 A. Pereira et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 56 (2015) 4–17punished. Hence, the values that we defend appear to drastically impact
our perceptions of an offense and our willingness to see the offender
group properly punished.References
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